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HIS Article reviews the major cases from the United States
Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and the
Texas courts of appeals in the following areas of criminal proce-
dure: pretrial (with the exception of confession, search, and seizure), trial
and appeal.
I. CHARGING INSTRUMENTS
Babaturde Olurebi was charged with the offense of credit card abuse.'
The indictment alleged that Olurebi used a "fictitious Chevron credit
card." Olurebi moved to quash the indictment for failure to define the
*B.A., J.D., The University of Texas, Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas
** B.A. The University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University, Attorney at
Law, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., Oklahoma City University, Attorney at
Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. Olurebi v. State, 870 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
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term "fictitious credit card." The trial court overruled the motion and the
Houston Court of Appeals affirmed. 2
A person commits the offense of credit card abuse if "with intent to
obtain property or service, he presents or uses a fictitious credit card
... "3 The Penal Code defines the term "credit card" but provides no
definition for the term "fictitious credit card."' 4 The Court of Criminal
Appeals determined that "fictitious credit card ... is either a credit card
not issued by the purported owner or a credit card with an actual owner
but issued to a non-existent cardholder."'5 This judicially devised defini-
tion of "fictitious credit card" meant that the offense alleged in the indict-
ment could be committed in two different ways. Olurebi could have used
a credit card that was not issued by Chevron or a credit card that was
issued by Chevron but to a person who does not exist.
A defendant may except to the form of an indictment if the indictment
fails to contain adequate information to give the defendant notice of the
offense of which he is accused. 6 If the indictment does indeed provide
adequate notice to allow the defendant to prepare a defense there is no
defect. 7 On the other hand, if some requisite item of notice is missing
from the charging instrument, the indictment is defective. This defect,
however, is not reversible error unless the defect had an impact on the
defendant's ability to prepare a defense.8 This is because a form defect
does not render an indictment insufficient unless the defect "prejudice[s]
the substantial rights of the defendant."
9
Generally, a charging instrument that tracks the statutory language is
sufficient. 10 Further, a term that is defined by the statute need not also
be defined in the charging instrument." However, if the statutory lan-
guage does not describe the offense in such a way as to give the defendant
adequate notice, additional specificity is required in the face of a motion
to quash.' 2
Applying the above principles, the Olurebi court concluded that the
indictment did not afford the accused sufficient notice of the meaning of
the term "fictitious credit card."'13 The Court of Criminal Appeals re-
2. Olurebi v. State, 818 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.) 1991, no pet.).
3. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.31(b)(2)(Vernon 1974).
4. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.31(a)(2)(Vernon 1974) defines credit card as "an
identification card, plate, coupon, book, number or any other device authorizing a desig-
nated person or bearer to obtain property or services on credit. [The term] includes the
number or description of the device if the device itself is not produced at the time of
ordering or obtaining the property or service."
5. Olurebi, 870 S.W.2d at 61.
6. Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
7. Id. at 903.
8. Id.
9. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 21.19 (Vernon 1989).
10. See DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
11. Id.; see also Ex pane Porter, 827 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)(op. on
reh'g).
12. Id.
13. Olurebi, 870 S.W.2d at 62.
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versed and remanded to the court of appeals to determine whether this
lack of notice impacted Olurebi's ability to prepare a defense, and, if so,
to what extent.14
II. FORMER JEOPARDY
In Ex parte Queen15 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution does not bar a
second trial following the granting of a motion for new trial on any
ground other than insufficiency of the evidence to support the convic-
tion. 16 Queen was convicted of burglary of a habitation. He then filed a
motion for new trial asserting, among other things, that the "verdict [was]
contrary to the law and evidence."'1 7 This motion was overruled by oper-
ation of law. Queen appealed, but the appeal was abated, and the trial
court was ordered to consider a second motion for new trial.'8 Although
the record is not clear, the trial court apparently granted this motion for
new trial. Queen then filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus
seeking to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds because the evidence at
his first trial was insufficient.
The Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that the federal and state
constitutions protect against "a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction and against multiple punishments for the same offense."' 19 The
court, however, held that a second trial would not place Queen in jeop-
ardy again because he had not previously been acquitted, convicted, or
punished.20 The Court of Criminal Appeals relied on its previous deci-
sion in Lofton v. State2' that analogized the granting of a motion for new
trial based on trial error, to the granting of a mistrial because of a hung
jury.22 Neither event terminates the defendant's original jeopardy. Con-
sequently, when a defendant's motion for new trial is granted based upon
trial error double jeopardy does not bar a retrial regardless of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence at the first trial.23
The holding in Queen and the previous holding in Lofton create a
somewhat curious and inefficient result. Queen indicates, although this
may be dicta, that if a trial court grants a motion for new trial based on
14. Id.
15. 877 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 910 (1994).
16. The court refused to consider whether the Texas Constitution bars a new trial be-
cause that issue was not presented to the court of appeals. 877 S.W.2d at 755 n.4.
17. Id. at 753.
18. Ex parte Timothy Hugh Queen, No. 01-91-00194-CR (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.], Mar. 15, 1991)(unpublished).
19. Ex parte Queen; 877 S.W.2d at 754 (quoting Lofton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 96, 96-97
(Tex. Crim. App. 1989)(citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
20. Id.
21. 777 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
22. The Lofton court relied on Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984) for
the proposition that a defendant may be retried following a hung jury even if the evidence
at the first trial was insufficient because a hung jury does not terminate jeopardy.
23. Ex parte Queen, 877 S.W.2d at 754-55.
1995] 1049
SMU LAW REVIEW
grounds alleging trial error and insufficiency of the evidence that a second
trial is not barred by double jeopardy. Only if a motion for new trial is
granted on the specific basis that the evidence was insufficient to support
the conviction is a retrial barred.24 Yet, if a defendant appeals his convic-
tion and challenges the sufficiency of evidence on appeal and complains
of trial errors, he is entitled to an acquittal if the evidence on appeal is
determined to be insufficient, even if there are also trial errors in the
case.25 The same result should apply when a trial judge reviews a convic-
tion pursuant to a motion for new trial. Otherwise, a defendant is forced
to waste the resources of the appellate courts in order to obtain the ac-
quittal to which he is entitled.
In a significant step backward for double jeopardy jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Dixon,26 overruled the recent case of
Grady v. Corbin.27 Prior to Grady a subsequent prosecution was barred
by the double jeopardy clause unless each offense contained an element
not contained in the other offense.28 Grady held that a subsequent prose-
cution was also barred "if, to establish an essential element of an offense
charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that con-
stitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prose-
cuted."' 29 Dixon returned double jeopardy jurisprudence to the same
elements tests. In light of Dixon, the Court of Criminal Appeals recon-
sidered its position on whether two offenses are the same for double jeop-
ardy purposes. 30
Parrish v. State3' involved a woman who was charged with speeding
and driving while intoxicated arising out of the same incident. The ac-
cused was first convicted of the speeding offense. She then challenged
the driving while intoxicated case on double jeopardy grounds. The
Court of Criminal Appeals considered this issue in light of Dixon.
The Court of Criminal Appeals compared the statutory elements of
driving while intoxicated and speeding and also examined the pleadings
in each case. Although some elements of each offense were the same,
there was at least one element of each statute that was not required to be
proven under the other statute.32 Accordingly, the United States Consti-
tution does not regard speeding and driving while intoxicated as the same
offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 33 Therefore, there is no double
jeopardy bar to prosecution for both offenses. 34
24. Id. at 755.
25. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1978).
26. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
27. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
28. This test is based on Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
29. Grady, 495 U.S. at 510.
30. See Parrish v. State, 869 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 354-55.
33. Id. at 355.
34. Id. (This case was remanded to the court of appeals to determine if the Texas
Constitution bars the subsequent prosecution).
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In Hoang v. State,35 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a convic-
tion obtained in a void proceeding does not bar retrial of the case. The
defendant in Hoang was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery and
sentenced to thirty-eight years in prison. The defendant subsequently en-
tered a guilty plea to three other counts of aggravated robbery and re-
ceived three concurrent ten year sentences. He served his time in prison
and was released on parole. Subsequently, the defendant challenged his
thirty-eight-year sentence on the ground that the court was without juris-
diction to try him because he was a juvenile when tried and had never
been certified to stand trial as an adult. The conviction was therefore
void. Consequently, the State reinstituted the proceedings so that the de-
fendant could be properly certified to stand trial. The defendant chal-
lenged the State's authority to prosecute him for the same offense.
The question for the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the
double jeopardy clause bars successive prosecution for the same offense
when the prior conviction was not in a court of competent jurisdiction.36
Ruling that a void judgment does not bar a successive prosecution, the
court reasoned that because a void conviction need not be respected, the
trial judge was free to ignore it.37 Since the previous conviction was null
and void, the new prosecution is legally the first prosecution and there-
fore does not constitute double jeopardy.38
The Court of Criminal Appeals in Hoang did not decide whether the
defendant, upon conviction in the retrial, would be entitled to credit for
time served on the void convictions; whether a second conviction would
violate the double jeopardy provision against multiple punishment; or
whether a longer sentence imposed upon conviction after the second trial
would violate the double jeopardy ban on additional or vindictive punish-
ment for the same offense. 39
Shute v. State40 addressed the question of whether the State may retry a
defendant for a lesser included offense following a bench trial that re-
sulted in a conviction arising out of the same incident, but later reversed
for insufficiency of the evidence. Shute was convicted of attempted capi-
tal murder in a trial before the court. He stipulated to the elements of
the offense, except to the element of whether the victim was a peace of-
ficer in the lawful performance of his duty. The trial court found Shute
guilty and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed for insufficiency of the
evidence. The State then indicted Shute for attempted murder arising out
of the same incident.
Shute sought habeas corpus relief, which was denied. 41 The court rea-
soned that since the trial judge could have found Shute guilty of a lesser
35. 872 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 117 (1994).
36. Id at 696-97.
37. Id. at 698.
38. Id. at 699.
39. Id.
40. 877 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
41. Id. at 315.
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included offense it follows that the judge necessarily found each element
of the lesser offense beyond a reasonable doubt when the judge found
Shute guilty of the greater offense. Following the decision in Ex parte
Granger,42 the court held the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial
on a lesser included offense when the first trial was a bench trial and
there was sufficient evidence upon which the trial judge could have found
the defendant guilty of the lesser offense.4 3
III. WAIVER OF JURY
The Court of Criminal Appeals clarified in Townsend v. State,44 that a
defendant's failure to execute a written waiver of trial by jury requires
automatic reversal of his conviction following a trial before the court.
Townsend was convicted of driving while intoxicated in a trial before the
court. The court of appeals held the failure to obtain a written jury
waiver violated the Code of Criminal Procedure, 45 but held that such er-
ror was harmless. 6 The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a failure of
the defendant to sign and file a written jury waiver is not subject to a
harm analysis.47 The failure to file a written waiver in a bench trial re-
quires automatic reversal of a conviction if raised on direct appeal.48
IV. JURY SELECTION
In a strong six to three decision, the Court of Criminal Appeals ex-
panded the remedy for a Batson violation in criminal cases. In 1986, Bat-
son v. Kentucky49 held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to purposefully or deliberately exclude black persons from jury
participation solely on account of their race. While condemning the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory strikes, the Supreme Court in Batson left
it to the lower courts to fashion the remedy for the improper use of per-
emptory strike. The two remedies available under Batson were the seat-
ing of the improperly struck juror or the dismissal of the entire jury
array.50
In response to Batson, the Texas legislature passed article 35.261 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 51 This article purported to codify
42. 850 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
43. Shute, 877 S.W.2d at 315.
44. 865 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
45. Article 1.13(a) provides that a waiver of the right to a jury trial "...must be made
in person by the defendant in writing in open court with the consent and approval of the
court, and the attorney representing the State." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
1.13(a)(Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1995).
46. Townsend, 865 S.W.2d at 469.
47. Id. at 470.
48. Id.; cf Ex parte Sadberry, 864 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)(conviction
will not be set aside by habeas corpus due to failure to sign written jury form).
49. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
50. Id at 100 n.24.
51. Article 35.261 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure states:
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Batson and provide the remedy for a violation of Batson by the State.52
The sole remedy prescribed by article 35.261 was that of dismissal of the
entire jury array and beginning anew the jury selection process. 53
In State ex rel. Curry v. Bowman54 the Court of Criminal Appeals de-
cided that the remedy set out in article 35.261 may be unconstitutionally
restrictive.55 In Bowman, a driving while intoxicated trial, the State used
three peremptory challenges to remove black jurors. The defendant
made a Batson objection and the trial judge, Wallace Bowman of County
Criminal Court No. 4 of Tarrant County, found that the State had pur-
posefully discriminated against two of the three veniremembers. Judge
Bowman disallowed the two improper strikes and ordered the two
veniremembers reinstated on the panel and seated them on the jury.56
The State filed a petition for writ of mandamus alleging that article
35.261 required the dismissal of the entire array when the trial court
found a Batson violation. Under the State's argument, Judge Bowman
had no authority to order the two improperly struck veniremembers
seated on the jury and was required by article 35.261 to dismiss the array
in response to a Batson violation.57
The Court of Criminal Appeals, through Judge Overstreet, character-
ized the issue of the case as being, "whether the prosecution is entitled to,
as a remedy, the dismissal of the array pursuant to article 35.261 when a
defense Batson motion has been sustained and the defendant acquiesces
to a remedy other than that prescribed in article 35.261(b).".58
(a) After the parties have delivered their lists to the clerk under Article
35.26 of this code and before the court has impanelled the jury, the defend-
ant may request the court to dismiss the array and call a new array in the
case. The court shall grant the motion of a defendant for dismissal of the
array if the court determines that the defendant is a member of an identifi-
able racial group, that the attorney representing the state exercised peremp-
tory challenges for the purpose of excluding persons from the jury on the
basis of their race, and that the defendant has offered evidence of relevant
facts that tend to show that challenges made by the attorney representing the
state were made for reasons based on race. If the defendant establishes a
prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the attorney representing the state
to give a racially neutral explanation for the challenges. The burden of per-
suasion remains with the defendant to establish purposeful discrimination.
(b) If the court determines that the attorney representing the state chal-
lenged prospective jurors on the basis of race, the court shall call a new array
in the case.
TEx. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.261 (Vernon 1989).
52. See Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 297 (1992) (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992). In Hill, the court stated that the legislature enacted article 35.261 to create
uniform procedures and remedies to address claimed constitutional violations during jury
selection.
53. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.261(b) (Vernon 1989).
54. 885 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 184 (1994).
55. Id. at 424.
56. Id. at 423.
57. Id
58. Id. at 422-23.
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Judge Overstreet began by tracing the history of Batson and its prog-
eny.59 Batson itself prohibited the State's use of peremptory challenges
to purposefully exclude black jurors from jury participation solely on ac-
count of their race. 6° However, Batson has been substantially extended
by other Supreme Court cases.61 In Powers v. Ohio,62 the Supreme Court
held that the defendant has standing to object to race based exclusion of
jurors through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and
the excluded jurors are the same race. 63 Likewise in Edmondson v. Lees-
ville Concrete Co.64, the Supreme Court held that Batson applied to pri-
vate litigants in civil cases and in Georgia v. McCollum, 65 the Supreme
Court applied Batson to defendants in criminal cases and prohibited a
criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the
ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
Most importantly, Powers and Edmondson clearly recognized that the
harm caused by a Batson violation is inflicted not only on the parties to
the litigation, but also on the excluded juror and the entire community as
well.66 Under these cases a citizen has a right not to be excluded from a
jury based on his or her race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.67
In Bowman, Judge Overstreet focused more upon these later cases ex-
panding Batson.68 He particularly considered the rights of the excluded
juror in finding article 35.261 to be too restrictive. Judge Overstreet
stated that, "[i]f the only remedy is dismissal of the array, the affected
veniremember is still not allowed to participate in the process. '69
Explaining that an objection based on Batson is not co-extensive with
an objection predicated upon article 35.261, Judge Overstreet found that
ordering the improperly struck jurors seated on the jury was a proper
remedy under Batson and its progeny.70 Specifically, Judge Overstreet,
and the court majority found that where a Batson objection is sustained
the trial court "may fashion a remedy in its discretion consistent with
Batson and its progeny."'71 While the court stopped short of requiring
that the improperly struck jurors always be reinstated on the jury, it is
clear from Bowman that if this is the remedy requested by the aggrieved
party, the trial court should reinstate the jurors.
59. Id. at 423.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 423-24.
62. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
63. Id. at 1373.
64. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
65. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1993).
66. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370-74; Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
67. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370-74; Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
68. Bowman, 885 S.W.2d at 424-25.
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The United States Supreme Court also addressed the Batson issue dur-
ing the last term. In J.E.B. v. Alabama,72 the Court held that Batson
prohibited the State's use of peremptory strikes based on gender.73
J.E.B. was a civil paternity case but the ruling will apply with equal force
to criminal cases.
In J.E.B. the State used nine of its ten strikes to remove male jurors.74
Ultimately, an all female jury was empaneled. 75 Justice Blackmun, writ-
ing for the court, concluded that the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution prohibits jury selection on the basis of gender
or on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case
solely because that person happens to be a woman or a man. 76 Essen-
tially, the Batson rule was extended to peremptory challenges based on
gender.
The court in J.E.B. left open whether this decision is limited to the
State's use of gender based peremptory strikes. Justice O'Connor, in her
concurring opinion, argues that this decision should only apply to the
State.77 However, based on Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., and
Georgia v. McCollum, she expressed her doubts that this case would be
limited to the State.78
V. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
In a series of cases beginning with Duckett v. State,79 the Court of
Criminal Appeals has addressed the confusing area of the admissibility of
expert testimony in child sexual abuses cases. In Yount v. State,80 the
court cleared away much of this confusion by making two very clear
rulings.
First, Yount held that testimony that a particular witness is truthful is
inadmissible8' as expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of
Criminal Evidence. 82 Secondly, Rule 702 does not permit an expert to
given an opinion that a class of persons to which the complainant belongs
is truthful.8 3
72. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
73. Id. at 1421-30.
74. Id. at 1421-22.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1425-30.
77. Id. at 1430-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430-33.
79. 797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
80. 872 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
81. Id. at 711.
82. Rule 702, Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, states: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." TEx. R.
CRIM. EvID. 702.
83. Yount, 872 S.W.2d at 711-12.
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In Yount, an eight-year-old complainant testified concerning sexual
contact inflicted on her by the defendant. Dr. Beth Naubert, an Austin
pediatrician, testified over the defendant's objection that of the hundreds
of children she had examined concerning sexual abuse very few were not
telling the truth.84
On direct appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals found error in the ad-
mission of this testimony.8 5 The court of appeals based its reversal on
Duckett.86 In Duckett, the Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed the ad-
mission of expert testimony on child sexual abuse under Rule 702. The
testimony at issue in Duckett concerned the behavioral stages that sexu-
ally abused children go through. The court concluded that the threshold
determination for admitting such testimony is whether the testimony "if
believed, will assist the untrained layman trier of fact to understand the
evidence or determine a fact in issue .... -87 Duckett further stated that
expert testimony which decides an ultimate fact for the jury, such as a
direct opinion on the truthfulness of the child, is not admissible under
Rule 702.88 Additionally, the court in Duckett held that Rule 403 of the
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence8 9 "applies to this testimony and it may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its preju-
dicial effect." 90 Lastly, the Duckett court held that such testimony may
not be admissible unless there had been prior impeachment of the
complainant. 91
In 1993, the Court of Criminal Appeals disavowed the language of
Duckett that had stated that impeachment of the complainant was neces-
sary before the expert testimony was admissible. In Cohn v. State,92 the
court made clear that Rule 403 did not require impeachment before ad-
missibility of expert testimony that assists the trier of fact.93
In Yount, the court further disavowed the prior impeachment require-
ment of Duckett.94 The court held that there was nothing in the language
of Rule 702 suggesting that expert testimony that is relevant as substan-
tive evidence is inadmissible unless it serves some rehabilitative func-
tion.95 Therefore, impeachment of the complainant is not a requirement
84. Id. at 707-08.
85. Yount v. State, 808 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Austin), remanded, 872 S.W.2d 706
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
86. Duckett, 797 S.W.2d at 906.
87. Id at 914.
88. d at 914, 918-19.
89. Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, states: "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." TEX. R. CRiM. EViD. 403.
90. Duckett, 797 S.W.2d at 917.
91. Id. at 918-19.
92. 849 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
93. Id at 819.
94. Yount, 872 S.W.2d at 706.
95. Id.
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for admissibility of expert testimony that is otherwise admissible under
Rule 702.96
The court in Yount then addressed the question of what type of expert
testimony is admissible. Finding that an expert on child sexual abuse is
not a "human lie detector," the court made clear that testimony that a
particular witness is truthful does not assist the jury under Rule 702 and is
therefore not admissible. 97 Rather, the court found that this testimony
attempts to supplant the jury and that a jury is capable of determining
truthfulness without expert assistance. Therefore, this type of testimony
is inadmissible. 98
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that the first requirement
for admissibility under Rule 702 is that the jury must not be qualified to
intelligently, and to the best degree, determine the particular issue with-
out the benefit of the expert witness' specialized knowledge.99 A deter-
mination of credibility of a witness is what juries do best and therefore,
the use of expert testimony on whether a person is telling the truth does
not meet this threshold requirement of Rule 702.100
On the additional question of whether testimony that a class of per-
sons, like children, is truthful, the court likewise found Rule 702 prohibits
the testimony.' 0 ' The court stated that an expert who testifies that a class
of persons to which the victim belongs is truthful is essentially telling the
jury that they can believe the victim in the instant case as well.102 The
court found that this is not expert testimony of the kind which will assist
the jury under Rule 702 and is therefore inadmissible. 10 3
While the Yount opinion dealt with child sexual abuses cases, its appli-
cation of Rule 702 will be equally relevant to prosecutions for other of-
fenses. In any case where expert testimony about the trutfulness of a
person or class of persons is offered, Yount will likely provide an insur-
mountable barrier to the admissibility of the testimony.
B. EXTRANEOUS Acrs EVIDENCE
Whether the limitation of evidence contained under Rule 404(b) of the
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence' 4 reaches only acts of misconduct was
96. Id.




101. Id. at 711-12.
102. Id
103. Id.
104. Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided, upon timely request by the accused, reason-
able notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in the State's
case in chief such evidence other than that arising in the same transaction.
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the subject of the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in Bishop v.
State.105 In Bishop, the evidence showed that the victim was attacked by
a man with a knife who threatened her and forced her to engage in nu-
merous acts of oral, anal and vaginal intercourse. The victim was also
forced to fondle herself. Additionally, the evidence showed that the as-
sailant did not ejaculate during the attack. 1°6
During the appellant's case in chief, the State, over objection, was al-
lowed to ask the defendant's ex-wife whether he had liked to engage in
anal intercourse, whether he had required her to fondle herself and
whether the defendant was capable of performing sexually for an ex-
tended period of time without ejaculating.10 7
On appeal, the Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed, 10 8 finding the
evidence was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403 of the
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. 1°9 The court of appeals also found
that this testimony, while not amounting to an extraneous offense, did
rise to the level of extraneous misconduct and therefore, fit under Rule
404(b). 110
At the Court of Criminal Appeals, the State argued that the acts testi-
fied to by the defendant's wife did not constitute misconduct and that
Rule 404(b) did not apply.1" This argument was rejected by the court.
The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the plain language of Rule
404(b) speaks to "other crimes, wrongs or acts," and that there is no re-
quirement that the evidence must be that of another criminal offense or
even misconduct in order to fall within the purview of Rule 404(b). 112
The court stated that the intent of the rule is to prevent the introduction
of evidence to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity with that character." 3 According to the court, this
prohibition applies as equally to evidence of extraneous acts or transac-
tions as it does to evidence of extraneous offenses." 4 Therefore, the tes-
timony in this case was found to be evidence of extraneous acts and Rule
404(b) did apply. 1 5
The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately agreed with the court of ap-
peals that this testimony was inadmissible and harmful and the case was
remanded to the trial court for a new trial.116 In the court's opinion, the
testimony was more prejudicial than probative and was inadmissible. The
TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 404(b).
105. 869 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
106. Id. at 344.
107. /d.
108. Bishop v. State, 837 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992), remanded, 869
S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
109. Id.
110. id.





116. Id. at 345-47.
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court noted that the State had substantial evidence tying the defendant to
the crime and that the testimony of the defendant's ex-wife was not par-
ticularly useful in pinpointing the defendant as the offender because the
practices described were not especially unique to the defendant. Addi-
tionally, although these practices were not criminal offenses, they were
considered improper, immoral and highly offensive by some segments of
the population so that the testimony could have unduly prejudiced some
jurors against the defendant. 117
C. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRANEOUS OFFENSES
In an exercise of judicial independence, the Court of Criminal Appeals
has interpreted the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence in a way contrary
to the interpretation given an identical rule by the United States Supreme
Court. In Harrell v. State"1 8 the court held that the standard for admissi-
bility of extraneous offense evidence at the guilt-innocence phase of the
trial is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This ruling requires the same
standard of proof for admissibility of extraneous offense evidence as is
required for consideration of that evidence by the jury.119
In reaching this conclusion, the court interpreted Rule 104 of the Texas
Rules of Criminal Evidence 120 as requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt before extraneous offense evidence was admissible. This interpre-
tation was at odds with the interpretation given to Rule 104 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 121 on the same question in Huddleston v. U.S.122
117. Id. at 346-47.
118. 884 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
119. Harrell was concerned with extraneous offense evidence at the guilt-innocence
phase of a trial under Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, Rule 404(b). However, Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 37.07, § 3(a) now requires that extraneous offenses or
bad acts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before they are admissible at the punish-
ment phase of a trial.
120. Rule 104(a) and (b) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence states:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence de-
pends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it
upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing of the fulfillment of the condition.
TEx. R. CRIM. Ev. 104(a), (b).
121. Rule 104(a) and (b), Federal Rules of Evidence, provides:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence de-
pends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it
upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing of the fulfillment of the condition.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a), (b).
122. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
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Huddleston held that evidence of an extraneous offense is admissible
under Federal Rule 104(b) if the jury could reasonably conclude by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the extra-
neous offense. 123
In declining to follow the Huddleston Court's interpretation of Rule
104, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Harrell noted that Texas has long
required a jury instruction that the jury not consider the extraneous of-
fense evidence unless they found beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant committed the offense. 124 The court concluded that the standard
for admissibility of the evidence should be the same as the jury's standard
for its consideration. 125 Speaking for the court, Judge Maloney stated
that it made no sense for the trial court to, on the one hand, admit evi-
dence of an extraneous offense using a certain standard for admissibility,
but then, on the other hand, instruct the jury not to consider that same
evidence unless it uses a different standard. 126
D. HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS TEST
The simmering controversy over the admissibility of the horizontal
gaze nystagmus (HGN) test in DWI prosecutions was put to rest by the
Court of Criminal Appeals in Emerson v. State.127 In Emerson, by taking
judicial notice of various scientific studies, the court concluded that the
HGN test is admissible in DWI prosecutions as a reliable indicator of
intoxication.12 8 However, the HGN test, under Emerson, is not admissi-
ble as an indicator of a precise blood alcohol level.' 29
The horizontal gaze nystagmus test involves an officer observing the
movement of a subject's eyes while a stimulus, such as a pen light, is
moved in front of the subject's eyes. The officer observes the eyes for an
inability to pursue the object smoothly. He also watches the subject's
eyes for a distinct or pronounced nystagmus, or involuntary rapid oscilla-
tion of the eyes, at the eye's maximum horizontal deviation. Addition-
ally, the officer looks for an angle of onset of nystagmus of less than or
equal to forty-five degrees. 130
The defendant in Emerson was arrested for DWI and among the tests
given by the officer was the HGN test.' 3 ' Her objection to its admissibil-
ity was overruled. On appeal, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the HGN
123. Id. 485 U.S. at 689.
124. Harrell, 884 S.W.2d at 158; see also Ernster v. State, 105 Tex. Crim., 422, 308
S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (1957); Nichols v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 324, 136 S.W.2d 221 (1940);
Vaughn v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 205, 118 S.W.2d 312 (1938); Miller v. State, 122 Tex. Crim.
59, 53 S.W.2d 790, 791-92 (1932); Lankford v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 442,248 S.W. 389 (1923).
125. Harrell, 884 S.W.2d at 158-60.
126. Id at 158.
127. 880 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 323 (1994).
128. Id. at 768-69.
129. Id. at 769.
130. Id. at 765-66.
131. Id. at 761-62.
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testimony. 132 In support of its holding, the appeals court cited Finley v.
State 33 and Lancaster v. State.'34 The courts in Finley and Lancaster both
held that testimony by a police officer concerning a defendant's perform-
ance on the HGN test was admissible as lay opinion testimony on the
issue of whether the defendant was intoxicated. 135
The Court of Criminal Appeals in Emerson disagreed with the conclu-
sion that HGN was admissible as lay opinion testimony. 136 Finding that
the HGN test is based on a scientific theory, the court treated it as novel
scientific evidence and applied the test set out in Kelly v. State.'37
In Kelly, the court had admitted DNA evidence under Texas Rule of
Criminal Evidence 702,138 as expert testimony. Explaining that the
threshold determination under Rule 702 is whether the expert testimony
is helpful to the trier of fact, the court applied the same analysis used in
Kelly.139
In order for scientific evidence to be found helpful and thus admissible,
the basis for the testimony must be reliable.' 40 If it is found reliable, it
may still be inadmissible under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 403 if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, misleading of the jury, undue delay, or presentation of cu-
mulative evidence.' 4 '
In Kelly, the court explained that to be considered reliable, evidence
based on a scientific theory must satisfy three criteria:
1. the underlying scientific theory must be valid;
2. the technique applying the theory must be valid; and
3. the technique must have been applied properly on the occasion in
question.142
The court in Emerson concluded that HGN is based on a valid scien-
tific theory by taking judicial notice of the studies and scientific literature
concerning the test.'4 3 The court concluded that taking judicial notice of
this material on appeal was proper even though it was not part of the
appellate record.'"
132. 846 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993), aff'd, 880 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 323 (1994).
133. 809 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).
134. 772 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-T'yler 1988, pet. ref'd).
135. Finley, 809 S.W.2d at 914; Lancaster, 772 S.W.2d at 138-39.
136. Emerson, 880 S.W.2d at 763.
137. 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
138. Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence states: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." TEX. R.
CRIM. EvID. 702.
139. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 568-573.
140. Id. at 572.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 573.
143. Emerson, 880 S.W.2d at 764-68.
144. Id. at 764-65.
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The court found that the scientific materials addressing the issue have
reached the uniform conclusion that the consumption of alcohol has a
cognizable effect on human eye movement. 145 Following the lead of sev-
eral other states that have considered the issue,' 46 the court concluded
that the technique employed in the HGN test is a reliable indicator of
intoxication.147 However, the court also concluded that the HGN tech-
nique is not a sufficiently reliable indicator of precise blood alcohol con-
tent and was not admissible for that purpose.148
Additionally, the Emerson court found that in order for testimony con-
cerning a defendant's performance on the HGN test to be admissible, it
must be shown that the witness testifying is qualified as an expert on the
HGN test.149 This qualification is met by a showing that a law enforce-
ment officer has received a practitioner certificate issued by the state of
Texas to administer the HGN test.150 And lastly, the court concluded
that none of the factors under Rule 403 outweighed the probative value
of the evidence.' 5'
In dissent, four judges took issue with the majority's application of the
judicial notice doctrine. They argued that the use of judicial notice was
improper because the information that the court was taking judicial no-
tice of was not commonly known or accepted. The dissenters contended
that the majority was simply using judicial notice to relieve the State of its
burden of proof to establish admissibility of the evidence under Rule
702.152
E. STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST
Under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 803(24), 153 a statement against
penal interest is an exception to the hearsay rule only when corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. In
145. Id. at 768.
146. Id. at 767; see also State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 171 (1986); State v. Murphy,
451 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1990); State v. Clark, 762 P.2d 853 (Mont. 1988), State v. Bresson,
554 N.E.2d 1330, 1334 (Ohio 1990).
147. Emerson, 880 S.W.2d at 768-69.
148. Id. at 769.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 769-70.
152. ad at 770-76.
153. Rule 803 (24) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence states:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declar-
ant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil
or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, or to
make him an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustwor-
thiness of the statement.
TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 803(14).
[Vol. 481062
PRETRIAL, TRIAL AND APPEAL
Davis v. State,154 the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the test for
determining whether there is sufficient corroboration.
Elisha Davis was charged with two cases of delivery of cocaine. The
defendant's brother, James Royal, told the defendant's mother that he,
not the appellant Davis, had sold the drugs in question. When Royal was
called as a witness he claimed his right against self-incrimination. The
defendant then called a third person, Patrick Ivory, who testified that he
was an eyewitness to the drug transaction and that Royal, not the defend-
ant, had sold the drugs. The defendant then attempted to have his
mother testify that Royal had confessed his guilt to her, but her testimony
was excluded based on a violation of the sequestration rule and also on
the ground that her testimony would constitute hearsay. 155
The Court of Criminal Appeals initially found that the trial court erred
in excluding the mother's testimony under the theory that the sequestra-
tion rule had been violated. 156 Then the court analyzed whether the
mother's testimony about Royal's confession was admissible as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(24).
According to the Davis opinion, the first inquiry "is whether the state-
ment tended to expose the declarant to criminal liability."'1 57 Since
Royal's statement implicated himself in the crime for which the defend-
ant was being prosecuted, it was one that "so far tended to subject him to
... criminal liability... that a reasonable man would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true.' 158
The court then stated that this was their first opportunity to set forth a
standard to be applied in determining the existence of corroborating cir-
cumstances for purposes of Rule 803(24). 159 The rule itself requires that
the circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to "clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.' 160 For this reason, the court stated
that the focus of the inquiry "is on verifying to the greatest extent possi-
ble the trustworthiness of the statement so as to avoid the admissibility of
a fabrication.' 16'
In determining the proper factors, the court examined federal authority
analyzing the parallel federal rule.' 62 Following the lead of the federal
courts, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that no definite test
154. 872 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
155. Id. at 744-45.
156. Id. at 745-46.
157. Id. at 747.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 803(24).
161. Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 748.
162. Rule 804(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declar-
ant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declar-
ant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would
not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate
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exists by which to gauge the existence of corroborating circumstances for
purposes of Rule 803(24). 163 Rather, several factors are to be considered
in making the determination of whether there is sufficient corroboration.
These factors include whether the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent
with the guilt of the accused, whether the declarant was so situated that
he might have committed the crime, the timing of the declaration and its
spontaneity, the relationship between the declarant and the party to
whom the declaration was made and the existence of independent cor-
roborating facts. 164
Additionally, the court held that evidence which undermines the relia-
bility of the statement, as well as evidence corroborating its trustworthi-
ness may be considered. 165 However, the court emphasized that in
making this determination the trial court is not to engage in a weighing of
the credibility of the in court witness, since this is the role of the jury.16 6
Moreover, the burden lies with the party seeking to admit the statement,
and the test is not an easy one; the evidence of corroborating circum-
stances must clearly indicate trustworthiness. 167
Applying this test to the facts of Davis, the court found that the trial
court erred in concluding that the circumstances were not sufficiently cor-
roborative to clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the brother's state-
ment.' 68 Among the factors weighing in favor of this conclusion was the
independent testimony of Ivory corroborating the brother's testimony
and alibi witnesses supporting the defendant's innocence. The court
found that the State's testimony that would undermine the reliability of
the brother's statement, such as the officer's identification of the defend-
ant as the person who sold him the drugs or the brother's possible motive
in making the statement to help the defendant were matters to be tested
on cross-examination but did not call for disallowing of the testimony.' 69
VI. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
How to define and apply culpable mental states in a "result of conduct"
offense has engendered much recent confusion in the opinions of the
Court of Criminal Appeals. In Cook v. State,170 the court wiped away the
confusion with a clear opinion that establishes the proper way to deal
with the culpable mental states in the "result of conduct" offenses.
the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indi-
cate the trustworthiness of the statement.
FED. R. EvID. 804(3).





168. Id. at 749.
169. Id.
170. 884 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
[Vol. 481064
PRETRIAL, TRIAL AND APPEAL
Lawrence Cook was charged with intentional murder pursuant to Texas
Penal Code section 19.02(a)(1) 171 and was convicted by a jury of the
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. 172 Following affirm-
ance of the conviction by the Dallas Court of Appeals, 173 the Court of
Criminal Appeals granted discretionary review to determine whether the
trial court correctly refused the appellant's request to limit the definitions
of the applicable culpable mental states to the result of the defendant's
conduct. 174
The indictment accused the defendant of knowingly and intentionally
causing the death of the decedent by stabbing the decedent with a
knife.175 The definitional portions of the jury instructions contained the
entire definitions of intentionally and knowingly under Texas Penal Code
section 6.03.176 The application paragraphs on both the murder and vol-
untary manslaughter portion of the jury charge stated that the defendant
was guilty if, among other elements, the jury found that the defendant did
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of the decedent.177
The defendant objected to the jury instructions based on the failure of
the instructions to limit the definitions of "intentionally" and "know-
ingly" to the result of the offense only. The objection was overruled by
the trial court. 178
171. Section 19.02(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code states: "(a) A person commits an
offense if he: (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual." TEX. PE-
NAL CODE § 19.02(a)(1)(Vernon 1994).
172. Voluntary manslaughter is defined in § 19.04 of the Texas Penal Code as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if he'causes the death of an individual
under circumstances that would constitute murder under Section 19.02 of this
code, except that he caused the death under the immediate influence of sud-
den passion arising from an adequate cause.
(b) "Sudden passion" means passion directly caused by and arising out of
provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed
which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of
former provocation.
(c) "Adequate cause" means cause that would commonly produce a de-
gree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper,
sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.
(d) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.04 (Vernon 1994).
173. Cook v. State, 827 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.).
174. Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 485.
175. Id. at 486.
176. "Intentionally" is defined in § 6.03 of the Texas Penal Code as follows:
(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature
of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware
of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts
knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03 (Vernon 1994).




The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no error
in the jury charge because the offense of intentional murder required a
finding of both an intent to engage in the conduct and an intent to cause
the result.179
In finding that the court of appeals was wrong, the Court of Criminal
Appeals discussed its cases dealing with this issue. 180 Beginning with
Beggs v. State,181 including Alvarado v. State,182 Kelly v. State'83 and Hag-
gins v. State,184 the courts have held that in "result of conduct" offenses,
such as injury to a child and injury to an elderly person, it was error not to
limit the culpable mental states of intentionally and knowingly to the re-
sult of the conduct. 185 In Alvarado, the court noted that homicide and
other assaultive proscriptions were "result of conduct" offenses and that
the culpable mental states apply only to the result of the conduct.' 8 6 The
court explained in Alvarado that the nature of the conduct in these of-
fenses is inconsequential to commission of the crimes as long as it in-
cludes a voluntary act. What matters is that the conduct is done with the
required culpability to effect the result the legislature had specified. 187
Against this history, the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion in Kin-
namon v. State,188 appeared to go in a different direction. Kinnamon was
charged with capital murder, which was clearly a "result of conduct" of-
fense. However, the Kinnamon court found that in a prosecution for a
"result of conduct" offense, "not only must an accused be found to have
intended to engage in the act that caused the death, he also must have
specifically intended that death result from that conduct.' 89 The Kin-
namon court then held that since the application paragraph of the charge
restricted the definition of intentional to its factual context, i.e., that the
appellant intentionally caused the death, there was no error. 190 This was
the result in Kinnamon even though the complete definition of intention-
ally was given in the jury instructions.' 9'
In Turner v. State,192 a plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals rec-
ognized that Kinnamon was wrongly decided and suggested Alvarado as
the proper standard. 193 However, in Turner, there was no objection to
179. Cook v. State, 827 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), remanded, 884 S.W.2d
485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
180. Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 487-88.
181. 597 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
182. 704 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
183. 748 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
184. 785 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
185. Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 487-88.
186. Alvarado, 704 S.W.2d at 39.
187. Id. at 39-40.
188. 791 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
189. Id. at 88-89 (citing Morrow v. State, 753 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).
190. Id at 87-89.
191. Id at 89.
192. 805 S.W.2d 423, 430-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (Miller, J., concurring opinion on
rehearing).
193. Id. at 430.
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the incorrect culpable mental state definitions and, finding no egregious
harm under Almanza v. State,194 the plurality voted to affirm the
conviction. 195
In Cook, the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically overruled Kin-
namon and resurrected Beggs, Alvarado, Kelly, and Haggins as stating the
proper rule. 96 The court specifically found that "[m]urder is an offense
which requires that the culpable mental state accompany the result of the
conduct, rather than the nature of the conduct.' 97 Under Cook, a jury
instruction which defines intentionally or knowingly as they relate to the
nature of the conduct as well as the result of the conduct is error. 198 Ad-
ditionally, the court found that in a "result of conduct" offense, an intent
to engage in conduct is not an explicit element to be proven and the jury
should not be charged on the engaging in conduct section of the culpable
mental states.' 99 The only way that the engage in conduct requirement
has any bearing is in determining whether there was a voluntary act or
omission.2°° However, this question is not part of the culpable mental
state definitions, but is dealt with under a separate section of the Texas
Penal Code.201
The finding of error in the jury charge did not compel reversal of the
case. Instead, the court remanded the case to the court of appeals for a
harm analysis.2°2
VII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In Connor v. State, James Connor entered a guilty plea to three viola-
tions of the Texas Securities Act. 20 3 His punishment was assessed at ten
years imprisonment probated for ten years. Connor was represented by
retained counsel at his trial. Following his trial, Connor wrote two letters
to the trial judge complaining that his guilty plea was involuntarily en-
tered and that his attorney did not effectively represent him. The letters
were not verified or supported by affidavits. The trial court construed the
letters as a motion for new trial, held a hearing, and then denied the re-
194. 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (opinion on State's motion for rehearing).
195. Turner, 805 S.W.2d at 432.
196. Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 490-92.
197. Id. at 490.
198. Id. at 491.
199. Id. at 491-92.
200. Id.
201. Section 6.01 of the Texas Penal Code states:
(a) A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct,
including an act, an omission, or possession.(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or re-
ceives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a suffi-
cient time to permit him to terminate his control.
(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense
unless a law as defined by Section 1.07 of this code provides that the omis-
sion is an offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.01 (Vernon 1994).
202. Cook, 884 S,W.2d at 491-92.
203. 877 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
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quest for a new trial. Connor was not represented by an attorney at the
hearing nor did an attorney assist him in the preparation of a motion for
new trial.
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Connor's motion
for new trial.2°4 The Austin Court of Appeals held that Connor's motion
for new trial was insufficient as a pleading because it was not verified or
supported by an affidavit. 205 Consequently, there was no motion actually
before the trial court.206 The lack of counsel at the hearing on the so-
called motion for new trial was therefore not error.20 7
The Court of Criminal Appeals examined the proceedings in Connor's
case in a broader manner than did the court of appeals. The Court of
Criminal Appeals construed Connor's complaint to be not only that he
was unrepresented at the hearing on the motion for new trial but also that
he did not have legal assistance in the preparation of a motion for new
trial.208 The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, did not decide whether
Connor was entitled to assistance in the preparation of a motion for new
trial but remanded the case to the court of appeals so that court could
make that determination. 20 9
Before remanding Connor's case the Court of Criminal Appeals
pointed out that a hearing on a motion for new trial is a critical stage of
the proceedings at which a defendant is entitled to be represented by
counsel.210 The court also opined that an attorney could "hopefully" help
avoid jurisdictional problems by preparing a motion for new trial with a
proper verification and affidavits where necessary. 211 Finally, the court
indicated that the court of appeals should determine whether Connor
knowingly and intentionally waived his right to counsel if the court of
appeals decides that Connor was entitled to an attorney to assist him in
the preparation of a motion for new trial.212
Surely, upon remand, the court of appeals will hold that Connor was
entitled to the assistance of an attorney in the preparation of a motion for
new trial. That seems to be the implication of the opinion from the Court
of Criminal Appeals. It makes no sense to say that a defendant is entitled
to an attorney at trial, at a hearing on a motion for new trial, and on
appeal, but not in the preparation of a motion for new trial. Connor's
fate will most likely rest on the determination of whether he effectively
waived his right to counsel, and not on whether he was entitled to counsel
at all.




208. 877 S.W.2d at 326.
209. Id. at 327.
210. Id. at 326.
211. Id. at 327.
212. Id. at 327 n.4.
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Even if an attorney prepares a motion for new trial for a convicted
defendant, that is no guarantee that the motion will be done correctly. In
Jordan v. State213 an attorney filed a motion for new trial alleging that the
previous trial attorney was ineffective. The trial judge denied the motion
without holding a hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals recognized
that where the motion for trial and the supporting affidavit reflect that
reasonable grounds exist for finding that relief could be granted on the
motion, a hearing must be held on the motion.214 This is required even if
the motion and affidavit do not contain every component legally required
to establish relief.215 Where, however, the motion and affidavit are
merely conclusory and do not allege specific facts, the trial judge does not
abuse his discretion in refusing to hold a hearing on the motion.216
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure define a "new trial" as "the
rehearing of a criminal action after a finding or verdict of guilt has been
set aside upon motion of an accused. '217 The effect of granting a new
trial is to restore "the case to its position before the former trial includ-
ing, at the option of either party, arraignment or pretrial proceedings ini-
tiated by that party. ''218 The Rules do not specifically authorize granting
a new trial as to punishment only. In fact, since the Rules speak in terms
of setting aside a verdict or finding of guilt and restoring a case to its
position before the former trial, it could be argued that the Rules author-
ize only a complete new trial and do not authorize a trial court to hold a
new punishment hearing only. This is the conclusion reached by the East-
land Court of Appeals in State v. Bates.219 The Fourteenth Court of Ap-
peals, however, came to the opposite conclusion.220 That court
recognized that the Rules of Appellate Procedure have not been inter-
preted in a rigid, literalistic manner.22' Relying on what the court per-
ceived as good public policy expressed in the Code of Criminal
Procedure's authorization to appellate courts to reverse and remand
causes for new trials on the issue of punishment,222 the court held that
trial courts possess the same power to grant a new trial as to sentencing
only. 223 The Court of Criminal Appeals will have to decide whether trial
courts really possess such a power in the absence of statutory
authorization.
213. 883 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
214. Id. at 665.
215. Id.; see also Vera v. State, 868 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no
pet. h.)(a defendant is not required to present a prima facie case in order to obtain a
hearing on a motion for new trial).
216. Id.
217. TEX. R. App. P. 30(a).
218. TEX. R. App. P. 32.
219. 833 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, pet. granted).
220. State v. Hight, 879 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 1994, pet. granted).
221. Id at 113 (citing State v. Gonzales, 855 S.W.2d 692,694-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
for its holding that a motion for new trial may be granted in the interest of justice).
222. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 44.29(b)(Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1995).




Rule 40(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure describes the
procedure that must be followed in order to appeal from a negotiated
guilty plea.224 Despite the Rule's seeming simplicity, appellants and the
courts have encountered numerous difficulties in applying it.
In Davis v. State225 the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to
a charge of aggravated possession of amphetamine. His punishment was
assessed at seven years imprisonment in accordance with a plea agree-
ment entered into by the defendant, his attorney, and the prosecutor.
The defendant gave a general notice of appeal and then challenged on
appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. The
court of appeals reviewed the sufficiency claim because it is a defect oc-
curring after entry of the plea.226 The Court of Criminal Appeals re-
versed and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the
defendant's notice of appeal did not comply with Rule 40(b)(1). 227 Ac-
cording to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Rule 40(b)(1) should be read
to bar an appeal for a nonjurisdictional defect occurring before or after
entry of the plea unless the notice of appeal states that the trial court
granted permission to appeal or it specifies that the matters raised on
appeal were first raised by written motion and ruled on before trial.228
According to the court, reading the Rule this way makes it consistent
with the admonition required by the Code of Criminal Procedure prior to
accepting a guilty plea.229
Reading Rule 40(b)(1) the way the Court of Criminal Appeals does in
Davis rewrites the Rule to bar an appeal for a nonjurisdictional defect
occurring after entry of the plea.230 Judge Clinton, in a very well-rea-
224. Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 40(b)(1) reads in pertinent part as follows:
... but if the judgment was rendered upon his plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere pursuant to Article 1.15, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the pun-
ishment assessed does not exceed the punishment recommended by the
prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and his attorney, in order to pros-
ecute an appeal for a nonjurisdictional defect or error that occurred prior to
entry of the plea the notice shall state that the trial court granted permission
to appeal or shall specify that those matters were raised by written motion
and ruled on before trial.
TEx. R. App. P. 40(b)(1).
225. 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994, no pet. h.).
226. Davis v. State, 773 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, pet. granted).
227. 870 S.W.2d at 47.
228. Id. at 46.
229. Id., referring to art. 26.13(a)(3) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure, that
reads as follows:
(a) Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the
court shall admonish the defendant of:... (3) the fact that if the punishment
assessed does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor
and agreed to by the defendant and his attorney, the trial court must give its
permission to the defendant before he may prosecute an appeal on any mat-
ter in the case except for those matters raised by written motions filed prior
to trial ....
TEx CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(3) (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1995).
230. Id. at 50 n.4 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
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soned dissent in Lyon v. State,231 makes the court's error in interpretation
very clear. Lyon, like Davis, was an appeal from a plea bargained convic-
tion. The trial judge specifically denied Lyon permission to appeal. Lyon
therefore filed a general notice of appeal and proceeded on appeal to
challege the trial judge's right to hear the case because of his relationship
to the victim, the voluntariness of his plea, the failure of the trial court to
properly admonish him, the ineffective assistance of his trial attorney, a
conflict of interest of his trial attorney, and the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
only issue that could be raised on appeal was the trial judge's relationship
to the victim since that was a jurisdictional issue.232 The majority consid-
ered all of the other defects or errors to be nonjurisdictional and thus not
justiciable on appeal absent the permission of the trial judge to raise them
on appeal.233 Judge Clinton pointed out in dissent that Rule 40(b)(1) ap-
plies only to plea agreements that comply with article 1.15 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. 234 Article 1.15 is a statutory mandate to review the
sufficiency of the evidence. Review of the sufficiency of the evidence and
compliance with article 1.15 arises after entry of the plea and thus is not
barred by Rule 40(b)(1). 235
Rule 40(b)(1) was intended to abrogate the so-called Helms rule.236
Rule 40(b)(1) allows an appellate court to address nonjurisdictional is-
sues that arose before entry of the plea thus broadening a defendant's
appellate rights from a guilty plea.237 The Helms rule bars consideration
of such issues on appeal from a non-negotiated guilty plea.238 The Helms
rule has never been extended to cover asserted error occurring at or after
entry of a non-negotiated plea.239 It would be strange indeed to hold that
by pleading guilty a defendant waived error that had not yet occurred. 240
Yet, that is exactly what the Court of Criminal Appeals did in Davis and
231. 872 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
232. Id. at 736.
233. Id
234. Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure reads in pertinent part as
follows:
No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly
rendered and recorded, unless the defendant upon entering a plea, has in
open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in writing in accordance
with Articles 1.13 and 1.14; provided, however, that it shall be necessary for
the State to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the de-
fendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for itsjudgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea
without sufficient evidence to support the same.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1995).
235. 872 S.W.2 at 741 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 734 (referring to Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) that
held that a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects that arose before entry of the
plea).
237. Id. at 735.
238. Jacks v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
239. Id. at 744 (remanded to court of appeals to consider asserted error occurring at
punishment stage of trial).
240. Id. at 743.
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Lyon. Nowhere does Rule 40(b)(1) prohibit the raising of errors that oc-
cur after entry of a guilty plea. The majority of the Court of Criminal
Appeals reads such a prohibition into the Rule apparently in an effort to
reduce the number of appeals from guilty pleas. Such an imaginative
reading of the Rule is not justified by a desire to lighten the appellate
workload.241
When a trial court excludes evidence, the party offering the evidence
has the right to make an offer of proof in question and answer form.242 In
Kipp v. State,243 the Court of Criminal Appeals was faced with the ques-
tion of whether this rule applies to a hearing held outside the presence of
the jury on the competency of a child to be a witness. The issue arose
because the Rules of Criminal Evidence state that a trial court is "not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges" in
determining whether a person is qualified to be a witness. 244 The Court
of Criminal Appeals held that irrespective of any conflict in the Rules of
Criminal Evidence the right to perfect a bill of exception in question and
answer form as authorized by the Rules of Appellate Procedure is abso-
lute and a trial court does not have discretion to deny a request to make
such a bill.245
The Texas Constitution confers upon courts of appeals appellate juris-
diction over factual sufficiency questions.246 The Constitution draws no
distinction between criminal cases and civil cases. The question thus
arises as to whether the courts of appeals should review the factual suffi-
ciency of the evidence in a criminal case and then reverse a criminal con-
viction if the judgment is so against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.
241. It also smacks of a violation of due process to bar a challenge to the voluntariness
of a guilty plea absent permission from the trial court to raise such a challenge and to
thereby allow an involuntary guilty plea to bar a challenge to truly nonjurisdictional de-
fects or errors without complying with Rule 40(b)(1). See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969)(it is error to accept guilty plea without affirmative showing on record that it is vol-
untarily and intelligently entered).
242. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 103(b) provides:
The court may add any other or further statement which shows the character
of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the
ruling thereon. It may, or at request of a party shall, direct the making of an
offer in question and answer form.
Rule 52(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in pertinent part as follows:
When the court excludes evidence, the party offering same shall soon as
practicable, but before the court's charge is read to the jury, be allowed to
make, in the absence of the jury, an offer of proof in the form of a concise
statement. The court may, or at the request of a party shall, direct the mak-
ing of the offer in question and answer form.
TEX. R. App. P. 52(b).
243. 876 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
244. TEX. R. CRim. EvID. 104(a).
245. 876 S.W.2d at 333.
246. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 provides that decisions of the courts of appeals "shall be
conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error."
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The legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is
reviewed pursuant to the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia;247 that
is, whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. On issues upon
which a criminal defendant has the burden of proof, such as an affirma-
tive defense or incompetency, the courts of appeals have exclusive au-
thority to determine whether a jury finding is against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence.248 The Court of Criminal Appeals has no
jurisdiction to review such a decision by a court of appeals. 249
The Court of Criminal Appeals has not yet decided whether the courts
of appeals have jurisdiction to make the same type of factual sufficiency
review regarding the elements of the offense that must be proved by the
state as they do in connection with matters that must be proved by the
defense. The courts of appeals continue to grapple with this issue while
they await guidance from the Court of Criminal Appeals. The courts of
appeals are currently divided over this issue. Some courts of appeals be-
lieve that the Texas Constitution authorizes a general factual review of
the evidence 250 and others believe that the Jackson v. Virginia legal stan-
dard of review should control.25' Ultimately the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals will have to define the limits of the courts of appeals' authority.
Should the Court of Criminal Appeals decide that the courts of appeals
do indeed have the power to review the factual sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support a criminal conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeals
will then have to decide such interesting questions as whether the princi-
ples of double jeopardy bar the retrial of a defendant whose case was
reversed because the evidence was factually insufficient to support his
conviction. 25 2
IX. COLLATERAL ATTACK
The Supreme Court has been less than sympathetic over the last sev-
eral years to persons seeking to collaterally attack criminal convictions.
The Supreme Court deviated from that trend this last term in McFarland
v. Scott.253 McFarland was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death. McFarland exhausted his direct appeals and then sought appoint-
ment of counsel in the trial court so that he could pursue post-conviction
247. 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
248. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
249. Ex parte Schussler, 846 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
250. Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref'd, untimely
filed); Hernandez v. State, 867 S.W.2d 900, 905 n.2 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no pet.
h.).
251. Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 436 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, pet. granted); Mc-
Clure v. State, 879 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref'd); Moosani v.
State, 866 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. granted).
252. Cf Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19
(1978).
253. 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994).
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relief. The trial court declined to appoint counsel for McFarland as did
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. McFarland then filed a pro se mo-
tion in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
asking that an attorney be appointed to assist him in the preparation of a
motion challenging his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. section
2254.254 The district court denied McFarland's motion for appointment
of counsel because no action was pending pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
2254. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had the au-
thority to appoint counsel to represent McFarland and to stay McFar-
land's scheduled execution while McFarland's attorney prepared a proper
application for a writ of habeas corpus.255 The Supreme Court concluded
that an indigent resident of death row is entitled to legal assistance in the
preparation of a habeas corpus application. 25 6 The Supreme Court
pointed out that this right necessarily includes a right for counsel mean-
ingfully to research and present a defendant's habeas claims.257 Thus, a
district court may stay a defendant's execution to effect this right.25 8
In Herrera v. Collins,259 the Supreme Court indicated, without a deci-
sion, that the execution of a truly innocent person would violate due pro-
cess. Taking a cue from the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal
Appeals held in State ex rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals,260 that a
claim by a condemned murderer that newly discovered evidence estab-
lishes his innocence of the crime of which he was convicted is cognizable
in a habeas corpus attack on his conviction. In order to be entitled to a
hearing on such a claim, the petitioner must meet the threshold standard
that the newly discovered evidence, if true, would create a doubt as to the
efficacy of the verdict and make it probable that the verdict would be
different.261 Once that threshold showing is met, the applicant must es-
tablish at a hearing that, based on consideration of the newly discovered
evidence in light of the entire record, no rational trier of fact could have
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to be entitled to relief.262
The underlying rationale for Holmes is not particularly clear. It is
therefore difficult to predict whether the Court of Criminal Appeals will
254. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) is the statute that authorizes a person convicted of a state
offense to challenge the conviction in federal court.
255. 114 S. Ct. at 2574. The Supreme Court relied on 21 U.S.C. § 848 (q)(4)(B)(1988)
that provides:
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title 28,
seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence,. any defendant who is or
becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investiga-
tive, expert, or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the
appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other serv-
ices in accordance with paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9).
256. Id. at 2578-579.
257. Id. at 2580.
258. Id.
259. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
260. 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim App. 1994).
261. Id. at 398.
262. Id. at 399.
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allow non-capital felony defendants to raise claims of innocence on
habeas corpus. In all likelihood, such an extension of Holmes will turn on
the court's determination of whether newly discovered evidence of inno-
cence causes a felon's conviction to violate the United States
Constitution.

